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VOLUME 38 SPRING 2004 NUMBER 2
SYMPOSIUM ON TOMORROW'S
ISSUES IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FOREWORD: CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Robert F. Williams*
This Symposium marks almost thirty-five years of commitment by
the Valparaiso University Law Review to the area of state constitutional
law. Beginning in 1969, with the publication of Robert Force's State "Bills
of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance,1 the Law Review
has made important contributions to our understanding of state
constitutional law. Professor Force called for a Renaissance in the use of
state constitutions, and the Law Review has contributed to that
Renaissance.
In 1996, in a Symposium recognizing the importance of Professor
Force's article, I observed that his "too-little recognized article foresaw
virtually all of the major themes and developments in state constitutional
law between 1969 and the present." 2 The 1996 Symposium, in the pages
of this Review, also substantially advanced the field of state
constitutional law.3 Now, the Law Review continues its contributions to
Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
1 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125 (1969).
2 Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism's First
Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii, xiv (1996).
3 Symposium, The New Judicial Federalism: A New Generation Symposium Issue, 30 VAL. U.
L. REV. xiii (1996).
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that field with the present Symposium. All of this work contributes to
fulfilling the "research agenda" in state constitutional law.
4
As reflected in this Symposium, much of the scholarly literature on
state constitutional law has been produced by sitting state judges.5 Chief
Justice Randall Shepard of the Supreme Court of Indiana, who has
already made a number of important contributions to the literature of
state constitutional law, 6 considers the advisability of using the certified
questions mechanism 7  to provide interpretations of the state
constitution.8  Federal courts, of course, do have diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction over state constitutional claims. 9 For questions
under the state constitution that are novel, however, Chief Justice
Shepard points out that often federal judges will propound certified
questions to state high courts.
Chief Justice Christine Durham of the Utah Supreme Court, also an
established figure in the area of state constitutional law,10 analyzes the
very important area of religious liberty under state constitutions." This
topic rose to even greater visibility during this Term of the Supreme
Court of the United States as it considered a challenge under the federal
4 Robert F. Williams, Foreword: A Research Agenda in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L.
REV. 1145 (1993).
5 For a partial list of these contributions, see Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third
Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 211 n.4 (2003).
6 Randall T. Shepard, Foreword: Indiana Law, The Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24
IND. L. REV. 499, 504-07 (1991); Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (1996); Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana
Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575 (1989); Randall T. Shepard, State High Courts as Central
Figures in the Future of the American Legal System, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1009 (1997). But
see Jon Laramore, Indiana Constitutional Developments: The Wind Shifts, 36 IND. L. REV. 961
(2003).
7 See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577
N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991); Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification
Experience, 19 GA. L. REV. 999 (1985); Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal
Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672 (2003); Larry Roth, Certified
Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-Proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1979).
8 Randall T. Shepard, Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Certified Questions a
Good Idea or a Bad Idea?, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 327 (2004).
9 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982); Robert A. Shapiro,
Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
10 See, e.g., Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of Law,
Politics and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1601 (2001); Christine M. Durham, Obligation or Power?
The New Judicial Federalism and the Policy Making Role of State Supreme Courts, 2 EMERGING
ISSUES IN ST. CON. L. 219 (1989).
11 Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevance of State
Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353 (2004).
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constitution to a restrictive state constitutional religion provision,12
although not one of the so-called Blaine amendments.13
Justice Randy Holland of the Supreme Court of Delaware, also an
important state constitutional law scholar, 14 addresses the important area
of the right to criminal and civil jury trials under state constitutions.15
This has particular importance in criminal cases, where state
constitutions can be more protective than the Sixth Amendment, and in
civil cases, because the federal Seventh Amendment has not been
applied to the states.' 6
Justice Roderick Ireland of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts provides a detailed look at the varying analytical methods
that his court has used in interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution.
17
His article is an important addition to the literature on state
constitutional interpretative techniques.'8
12 Locke v. Davey, No. 02-1315, 2004 WL 344123 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2004). See Robert William
Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry By
Opponents of School Choise, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413 (2003); David G. Savage, Odd
Start for Lively Term, 89 A.B.A. J. 26 (Oct. 2003).
13 See Frank J. Conklin & James M. Vache, The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause of the Washington Constitution -A Proposal to the Supreme Court, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 411, 431-33, 436-42 (1985); Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the
Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15
HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 451 (1988); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 657, 659, 670-74 (1998).
14 RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2002);
THE DELAWARE CONSTITUTION OF 1897: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS (Randy J. Holland,
ed., 1997); Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989
(1996).
15 Randy J. Holland, State Jury Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common Law
Concepts, 38 VAL U. L. REV. 373 (2004).
16 Id. at 387-89.
17 Roderick L. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Has Interpreted Its State Constitution to Address
Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 405 (2004).
18 See, e.g., Neil H. Cogan, In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173 (1992);
James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992);
Jeffrey A. Parness, Failed or Uneven Discourse of State Constitutionalism?: Governmental
Structure and State Constitutions, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 155 (1992); David Schuman, A Failed
Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 274 (1992); Robert F. Utter, The Practice of
Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1153 (1992); see also James A. Gardner, Discourse and Difference- A Reply to Parness and
Cogan, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 193 (1992); Roundtable, Responses to James A. Gardner, The Failed
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761 (1992), 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993).
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Judge Laura Denvir Stith of the Supreme Court of Missouri provides
a careful assessment of state habeas corpus litigation and the special
problems of claims of "actual innocence" (more important now in the
age of DNA evidence) and retroactive application of constitutional
rulings.1 9 Like the doctrines of harmless error20 and prophylactic rules,
21
retroactivity in habeas corpus proceedings does form an important
component of judicial application of state as well as federal
constitutional rules. This is a significant addition to the literature on
state constitutional law, and it furthers our understanding of state court
authority over the retroactive application of federal constitutional rulings.
Judge Stith demonstrates that federal habeas corpus is another area
where the Supreme Court of the United States exercises considerable
restraint out of deference to the states, making such national rulings
inappropriate models for state emulation.Z2
Judge Jack Landau of the Oregon Court of Appeals, who has raised
important cautionary criticisms of state constitutional law
methodology,23 continues that theme here in his refreshingly candid
criticism of state courts' use of constitutional history in interpreting their
state constitutions.24 He points out and analyzes a number of specific
fallacies state courts commit in their reliance on state constitutional
history. He acknowledges, but does not analyze the problem of linking
framers' intent to ratifying voters' intent as an important step in relying
on state constitutional history.25
19 Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief,
38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (2004).
20 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 561 (Wis.
1996) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); Angus M. MacLeod, Note, The California Constitution
and the California Supreme Court in Conflict Over the Harmless Error Rule, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 687
(1981).
21 Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial
Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283 (2003).
22 Id.; see also Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353, 389-97 (1984); Williams,
infra note 50, at 1051-53.
23 Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793 (2000).
24 Jack L. Landau, A Judge's Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in State
Constitutional Interpretation, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 451 (2004).
25 Id. at 483 n.137. See generally Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State
Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 200-01 (2002).
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As legal historian Stephen Gottlieb has observed, reference to state
constitutional history "is valuable whether or not one subscribes to a
jurisprudence of original intent."26 He continued:
For those who reject a jurisprudence of original intent,
constitutional history nevertheless helps us to preserve
the lessons embodied in the drafting of the provisions at
issue and to explore the consequences of the language
chosen. State constitutional history has become more
important as the United States Supreme Court has
become less protective of individual rights.27
Reliance on constitutional convention or commission records, or
newspaper coverage of state constitutional conventions and
commissions would be used, as Professor William Fisher says, in the
"contextualist method." 28  This method asserts that, by attending
carefully to the discourse out of which a text grows (the vocabularies
available to its author, the concepts and assumptions he took for granted,
and the issues he considered contested), one can (and should) ascertain
the author's intent.29 Although Professor Fisher concludes that this
approach is flawed,30 a number of lawyers and judges make use of state
constitutional history in this way. Cass Sunstein has described the
constitutional lawyer's (by contrast to the historian's) task of presenting
a "usable past":
26 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Foreword to Symposium on State Constitutional History: In Search of
a Usable Past, 53 ALB. L. REV. 255, 258 (1989); see also TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY
UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991); Pierre
Schlag, Framers' Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 283 (1985).
For a review of the debate over original intent at the federal level, see Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999).
27 Gottlieb, supra note 26, at 258.
28 William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of
the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065,1104 (1997).
29 Id.; see also Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
American constitutional theorists are correct to turn to the history
of the Founding for a number of reasons. Most generally, situating
ideas in the context in which they arose enables us to comprehend and
assess those ideas better than we would by viewing them as free-
floating principles. This follows because the original historical setting
almost invariably suggests reasons to accept or reject a given idea that
would not otherwise be apparent.
Id. at 550.
30 Fisher, supra note 28, at 1105, 1107.
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The search for a useable past is a defining feature of the
constitutional lawyer's approach to constitutional
history. It may or may not be a part of the historian's
approach to constitutional history, depending on the
particular historian's conception of the historian's role.
The historian may not be concerned with a useable past
at all, at least not in any simple sense. Perhaps the
historian wants to reveal the closest thing to a full
picture of the past, or to stress the worst aspects of a
culture's legal tradition; certainly there is nothing wrong
with these projects. But constitutional history as set out
by the constitutional lawyer, as a participant in the
constitutional culture, usually tries to put things in a
favorable or appealing light without, however,
distorting what actually can be found.31
In State v. Baker3 2 Vermont Chief Justice Jeffrey Amestoy described
the use of state constitutional history in interpretation as follows:
[T]he responsibility of the Court... is distinct from that
of the historian, whose interpretation of past thought
and actions necessarily informs our analysis of current
issues but cannot alone resolve them .... Out of the
shifting and complicated kaleidoscope of events, social
forces, and ideas that culminated in the Vermont
Constitution of 1777, our task is to distill the essence, the
31 Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 603 (1995).
What I am suggesting is that the constitutional lawyer, thinking
about the future course of constitutional law, has a special project in
mind, and that there is nothing wrong with that project. The historian
is trying to reimagine the past, necessarily from a present-day
standpoint, but subject to the discipline provided by the sources and
by the interpretative conventions in the relevant communities of
historians. By contrast, the constitutional lawyer is trying to contribute
to the legal culture's repertoire of arguments and political/legal
narratives that place a (stylized) past and present into a trajectory
leading to a desired future. On this view, the historically-minded
lawyer need not be thought to be doing a second-rate or debased
version of what the professional historians do well, but is working in a
quite different tradition with overlapping but distinct criteria.
Id. at 605; see also Douglas A. Hedin, The Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota's
Constitutional Past, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241 (2003); Richard H. Pildesn, Keeping Legal
History Meaningful, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 645 (2002).
32 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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motivating ideal of the framers. The challenge is to
remain faithful to that historical ideal, while addressing
contemporary issues that the framers undoubtedly could
never have imagined.33
Judge Landau criticizes the use of constitutional history in this
Vermont case.34 By contrast, Justice Ireland generally supports resort to
constitutional history in interpreting state constitutions.
35
Still, one must be careful not to view constitutional history as
providing a single truth. As H. Jefferson Powell cautioned:
One of the most common sources of misunderstanding
and anachronism in constitutional history stems from
the desire to identify a common set of ideas and
arguments shared by groups labeled "the founders,"
"framers," "'traditional' constitutional lawyers," or
similar appellations. This desire easily leads one to find
more agreement and intelligibility in the past than was
in fact there.36
Analysis of, and reliance on, state constitutional history has been an
integral part of the New Judicial Federalism. 37 This is partially because,
in contrast to federal constitutional history, more details are available at
the state level.38 Additionally, as Dr. G. Alan Tarr has pointed out, a
careful look at state constitutional history (in addition to textual
differences) can be used to justify an interpretation of the state
constitution that is more protective, or recognizes greater rights, than
those available at the federal level.39
33 Id. at 874; see Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons
from Vermont's State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73,
79-86 (2001).
34 Landau, supra note 24, at 457-60.
35 Ireland, supra note 17, at 409-11.
36 H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53 ALB. L.
REv. 283,283-84 (1989); see Landau, supra note 24, at 454-57.
37 See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 841, 852 (1991).
8 Id.
39 Id. at 848 ("If a divergent interpretation may be justified by reference to the distinctive
origins or purpose of a provision, then state jurists must pay particular attention to the
intent of the framers and to the historical circumstances out of which the constitutional
provisions arose."). Id.
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Michael John DeBoer provides a detailed look at not only the
evolution and content of state constitutional equality doctrine in Indiana,
but also the egalitarian intent and effect of many of the other provisions
contained in the Indiana Constitution.40 He accurately notes that the
Indiana Constitution, like many others, contains a wide variety of
equality clauses. 41 Independent interpretation of such clauses has taken
on new importance in Indiana since the important 1994 decision in
Collins v. Day,4 2 which gave an independent interpretation to Indiana's
"Privileges and Immunities Clause." 43 By contrast, a number of other
state courts continue to interpret their equality provisions in lockstep
with the federal Equal Protection Clause.44
The "New Judicial Federalism" continues to evolve, both in the legal
literature and in the courts.45 Despite the warning in 1983 by Justice
Robert Jones of Oregon that any "lawyer who fails to raise an Oregon
constitution violation and relies solely on parallel provisions of the
federal constitution ... should be guilty of legal malpractice," 46 many
lawyers continue to litigate without adequately raising or briefing state
constitutional arguments.47
40 Michael John DeBoer, Equality as a Fundamental Value in the Indiana Constitution, 38
VAL. U. L. REV. 489 (2004).
41 Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1013 (2003).
42 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994).
43 Id. at 75; see DeBoer, supra note 40, at 565-67.
44 See, e.g., Master Builders of Iowa, Inc. v. Polk County, 653 N.W.2d 382, 398 (Iowa
2002); In re Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 78 P.3d 419 (Kan. 2003); Harvey v. State, 664 N.W.2d
767, 770 (Mich. 2003); Lutheran Bhd. Research Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 656 N.W.2d
375, 382 (Minn. 2003); Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tenn. 2003). See generally
Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195
(1985); Foreword: The Importance of an Independent State Constitutional Equality Doctrine in
School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675 (1992); A "Row of Shadows":
Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Approach to its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343 (1993). But see Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663
N.W.2d 43, 66 (Neb. 2003) (equal protection and special laws tests are different).
45 Williams, supra note 5, at 211; see also Ka Tina R. Hodge, Comment, Arkansas's Entry
into the Not-So-New Judicial Federalism, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 835 (2003).
46 State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring specially).
47 See, e.g., State v. Dean, 76 P.3d 429, 432 n.1 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Lamar, 72 P.3d 831,
835 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Ceballos, 832 A.2d 14, 21 n.4 (Conn. 2003); Overstreet v. State, 783
N.E.2d 1140, 1162 n.15 (Ind. 2003); Sims v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345,
353 n.1 (Ind. 2003); State v. Holzer, 656 N.W.2d 686, 690-91 (N.D. 2003); Sherman v. Dep't of
Revenue, 71 P.3d 67, 69 n.4 (Or. 2003); Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tex. 2003); Bell
v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Smith, 59 P.3d 74, 78 (Wash.
2002).
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The New Mexico Supreme Court has carefully set out explicit
instructions for lawyers and lower court judges regarding how state
constitutional claims are to be raised and preserved. 48 This issue has
been important in a number of states confronting the New Judicial
Federalism.49
A number of states have attempted to develop criteria to guide and
limit state courts in their decision about whether to interpret their state
constitutions to provide more rights than are guaranteed at the federal
level. I have described the "criteria approach" elsewhere.50  This
approach continues to be attractive.5 1 I have argued that the criteria
approach gives improper deference to the Supreme Court of the United
States, which is interpreting a different constitution under different,
national, circumstances. 5 2 The Texas Supreme Court noted that the
rights claimant:
has not articulated any reasons based on the text,
history, and purpose of Article I, section 8 to show that
its protection of noncommercial speech is broader than
that provided by the First Amendment under the
circumstances presented. Accordingly, we decline to
hold that the Texas Constitution affords ... greater
rights than does the First Amendment. 53
California continues to adhere to its view that "cogent reasons must
exist" for it to interpret its state constitutional provisions differently from
the analogous federal constitutional provisions5 4 The Supreme Court of
Washington has continued its interesting application of its 1986 Gunwall
decision, requiring litigants to brief state constitutional claims in a
48 State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 5-10 (N.M. 1997).
49 See State v. Gordon, 66 P.3d 903, 913 (Kan. 2003); Robert F. Williams, New Mexico State
Constitutional Law Comes of Age, 28 N. MEX. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1998).
50 See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and
Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1015, 1021-22 (1997); Williams, supra note 5, at 218-19.
5' Williams, supra note 50, at 1022-26.
52 Id. at 1046-55.
53 Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86, 106 (Tex. 2003).
54 People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 375 (Cal. 2003); see also State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64 (Ariz.
2003); State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363 (Conn. 2003); Correia v. Rowland, 820 A.2d 1009, 1017-18
(Conn. 2003).
-- 4
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certain way where there are analogous federal provisions.55 Such special
briefing is not required, however, where the Washington Supreme Court
has already determined that the state constitutional provision is more
protective than the analogous federal provision.56
Many state courts have continued the very common practice of
interpreting their state constitutional provisions in "lockstep" with the
Supreme Court of the United State's interpretation of analogous federal
constitutional provisions.5 7 We are, however, well into the "Third Stage"
of the New Judicial Federalism:
The most vitriolic reactions to the New Judicial
Federalism now seem to have died down. More and
more members of the public, lawyers, judges, academics
and members of the media have learned that state
constitutions may, in fact, be interpreted to provide
more rights than the national minimum. This fact is no
longer such a surprise to people as the maturation
process of the New Judicial Federalism has continued.5
This symposium will contribute substantially to the further
development of state constitutional law.
55 State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986). See generally Williams, supra note 50, at
1026-29 (criticizing the Gunwall approach). Pennsylvania is slightly less rigid. Id. at 1031-
33; Commonwealth v. Smith, 818 A.2d 494, 499 (Pa. 2003).
5 State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 48 (Wash. 2002); State v. Vickers, 59 P.3d 58, 67 n.43
(Wash. 2002).
57 See, e.g., State v. Nowell, 817 A.2d 76, 84 (Conn. 2003); People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d
260, 264 (Ill. 2003); People v. Ghema, 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Ill. 2003); Doe v. O'Conner, 790
N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind. 2003); In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 577 (Minn. 2003);
Damron v. State, N.W.2d 650, 654 (N.D. 2003); Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 844
(Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Busanet, 817 A.2d 1060, 1066 (Pa. 2002); State v. Jorgensen,
667 N.W.2d 318, 327 (Wis. 2003); State v. Davison, 666 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Wis. 2003); Sarr v.
State, 65 P.3d 711, 715 (Wyo. 2003). See generally Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting
Federal Constitutional Law: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping? WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
58 Williams, supra note 5, at 219 (citing Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State
Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (1996)).
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